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Congress, Defense and The Budget Enforcement Act in 1992
Richard Doyle and Jerry McCaffery
In 1992, the Congressional budget process was characterized by
business as usual. President Bush proposed a sweeping economic
plan and asked for its immediate consideration, but it was largely
ignored as Congress focused on the same issues which had
preoccupied it for the previous two years. These included defense
spending, the deficit, entitlements, new taxes and maintaining the
discipline of the budget process as modified by the Budget
Enforcement Act of 1990 (BEA). 1 In 1992 this discipline centered
on the preservation of the walls between the discretionary
accounts, while retaining the deficit-neutral requirement for
mandatory spending and tax expenditures. On the whole, the BEA
budget controls held, although the operating deficit increased.
This report examines the major budget developments of 1992
within the framework of the BEA. These developments axe "then
assessed to identify the limits of spending control as required by
the BEA. Spending control under the BEA has been essentially
confined to defense cuts made possible by the end of th Cold War.
The law compels little more in the way of deficit reduction.
Significant growth in "other areas of the budget and a reluctance to
raise taxes to reduce the deficit have defeated further attempts at
deficit reduction.
The Setting
Federal budget policy makers approached the 1992 budget
process in a context which included 12 years of deficits greater
than 2.7 percent of GDP. While at 4.9 percent of GDP the 1992
deficit would not be the largest in history, it was substantial and
t
increasing. Moreover, while revenues seemed stable at 18 percent
of GDP, spending appeared to be increasing to a new high of 23.5
percent of GDP. Chart 3-1 from The Budget of the United States,
January 1992, illustrates these trends.
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Chart 2-5, also from The Budget of the United States 1992,
takes a slightly longer view to indicate in broad terms how the
bulk of expenditures has changed from domestic discretionary and
defense expenditures to mandatory expenditures, with mandatory
expenditures increasing dramatically in a trend that begins in the
mid 1960's and defense expenditures decreasing from 1987. In 1992,
congressional action would reflect the significance of accelerating
mandatory payments in budget deliberations.
Chart 2-5. "MANDATORY" PROGRAMS ARE TAKING OVER THE BUDGET
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As is usual, Congress was faced with several long range
deficit projections. Chart 2-6 (Budget o.f the United States 1992),
shows five such projections. The only projection which would
decrease the deficit to zero by 1998 included a cap on mandatory
programs, allowing only demographic growth and the cost of
inflation. Although the President favored such a cap, he did not
propose it in his budget for FY93. As proposed, the President's
budget would bring the deficit down to the $200 billion range. If
no policy changes were made, then the deficit would range in the
$250 billion area (business as usual) . A lower growth economy, of
course, would increase the deficit.






























One obvious target of budget reduction was in the area of
health care costs. Chart 2-11 (Budget Qf the United States 1992),
indicates that a substantial share of health care spending goes to
the non-poor and that the rate of increase out to 1995 is greater
for the non-poor than for the poor. Health care cost containment
was an issue with which Congress would begin to cope in the 1992 process.
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350
Chart 2-11. FEDERAL HEALTH SPENDING
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While Congress could do little to contain health care costs in
1992, it was obvious that the mandatory area was the major driver
for budgetary increases. Chart 3-3 (Budget Baselines, Historical
Data, and Alternatives For the Future 1993) indicates that if
discretionary spending were capped at the rate of growth of the
consumer price increase, it would actually cost the federal
government money in the short and the long run, meaning that these
programs were currently growing at less than the rate of inflation.
Whereas, if the mandatory accounts were allowed to have both an
adjustment for full inflationary growth and for demographic growth
in the number of persons qualifying for mandatory programs,
substantial savings would accrue. This area of the budget was
increasing faster than inflation and demographic trends combined.
Chart 3-3. SAVINGS RELATIVE TO BASELINE IF:
(A) HOLD DISCRETIONARY TO CPI GROWTH v«.
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NOTE: Savings are relative to OMB Baseline.
The other significant factor that policy makers had to face in
1992 was the perception that peace had been achieved and that there
ought to be forthcoming a significant peace dividend from the
defense budget accounts.
Defense
The BEA caps on discretionary spending were set in 1990 so
that all of the savings from this portion of the budget would come
from defense. 2 The $289 billion BEA ca"p for the third year (FY
1993) represented a five percent cut in defense. The Bush defense
budget for FY 1993 would add further savings by funding defense
$7.5 billion below this cap. 3 The Bush plan would continue the
builddown that began in 1985. 4 For the FY 1993-97 period, the Bush
budget would cut $50.4 billion, including a proposed $7.9 billion
rescission package which would terminate, among other systems, two
Seawolf submarines. The Bush defense proposal, CBO noted,
reflected "the end of the Cold War. . . By 1997, defense would
reach a level 18 percent lower than an average budget for the last
one and half decades of the Cold War." 5
In its budget resolution, Congress cut defense another $3.6
billion below the Bush request. Congress considered, but
ultimately rejected, the notion that these savings should be spent
rather than saved. President Bush supported the use of additional
defense cuts for deficit reduction.
Evidence regarding the general threat from the former Soviet
Union continued to suggest that reductions in defense in addition
to those initiated in 1990 and institutionalized in the BEA
discretionary caps, would not jeopardize US national security. In
January, the CIA said that the military danger from former Soviet
Republics "has all but disappeared for the foreseeable future." 6
In February, President Bush announced an agreement,
negotiated with President Yeltsin, lor strategic arms cuts of 50
percent or more beyond START, "the deepest cuts in the history of
strategic nuclear weapons." 7 Eight months later the Senate
ratified this agreement, approving nuclear weapons cuts in excess
of those negotiated during the nine years of talks necessary to
produce the original START agreement. The 1992 agreement was the
first treaty to cut , as oppose to limi^t, strategic or long-range
nuclear weapons. 8 A symbolic indication of the transformation of
the security environment was the announcement by DoD that it was
discontinuing publication of its annual depiction of the Soviet
threat, Soviet Military Power . This volume had been issued since
1981. Following the failed coup in the USSR in 1991, it was
retitled Military Forces in Transition . It has now been dropped.
There were also indications that the BEA defense cuts may have
been too severe, reducing the ability of U.S. forces to respond to
residual threats and emerging problems. General Powell, Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, indicated that "in a very real sense,
the primary threat to our security is instability and being
unprepared to handle a crisis or war that no one expected or
predicted." 9 The situation affecting the status of nuclear weapons
.
in the former Soviet Union is said to be "as unstable and
potentially dangerous as when the former superpower collapsed." 10
CIA Director Gates testified to Congress that Iran was developing
weapons of mass destruction. He estimated that between 1990 and
1995, Iran will spend on defense the same amount that Bush proposes
to cut from the US defense budget between 1993 and 1997. 11 Gates
also indicated that North Korea could have a nuclear weapon within
months or a few years.
The Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, Les Aspin,
argued that the Bush defense budget was too large and
insufficiently linked to a specific threat to U.S. national
security. It is, Aspin said, "a one revolution budget in a two
revolution world." 12 Aspin' s defense budget, based on a House
Armed Services Committee analysis using Irag as a threat measuring
device, would cut roughly twice as much from defense as the
President. Dod refers to the Aspin budget as "not a serious
document." 13 However, the day after the Aspin defense plan is
released, the House Budget Committee incorporated it into their
budget resolution.
The Senate budget resolution supported the Bush Defense
budget. It rejected an amendment by the Chairman of the Senate
Budget Committee, Senator Sc£ser, which would have cut twice as
much. On the Senate floor, the budget resolution defense number
remained intact, as another amendment to double the Bush cut is
defeated. The Senate Armed Services Committee adopted the defense
budget stipulated in the budget resolution, while calling for more
cuts in the outyears as well as a review of roles and missions for
FY 1994.
In the conference on the budget resolution, Congress agreed to
cut defense $11.6 billion below the BEA cap. All House Republicans
voted against the conference agreement, which barely passed in that
chamber, 209-207.
Another major defense cut took the form of a rescission bill
worth $8.3 billion. President Bush requested a $7.9 billion
rescission, composed almost entirely of defense programs. Congress
approved an additional $0.4 billion in rescissions, about 89
percent of which was in defense. 14 Congress restored one of the
Seawolf submarines proposed for cancellation in the President's
package, although most agree that there was no foe against which
this boat would merit deployment; rather it was restored by
Congress as a jobs and industrial base issue.
The outcome for Congress and the administration on defense was
a draw. The administration defense request was cut, despite the
fact that it came in below the BEA cap. However, an initiative
supported by the Democratic leadership in Congress, which would
have spent these savings rather than using them for deficit
reduction, was defeated. The $11.6 billion in additional savings
from defense in FY 1993 represents a modest extension of the
spending control approach established in 1990.
Retaining Walls
The BEA divided the discretionary portion of the budget into
three categories—defense, domestic and international affairs—and
set spending caps for each category. These divisions were to last
through FY 1993, the last year of the Bush presidency. This
arrangement provided a compromise on the defense versus domestic
spending issue which had contributed to the budget gridlock that
dominated budgeting during the 1980s. The BEA walls also prevented
Congress from moving unspent funds from one category of
discretionary spending to another; the only alternative "to spending
within the designated budget categories was deficit reduction. 15
Tested in 1991 following the unsuccessful coup in the former Soviet
Union, the BEA walls had proved surprisingly resilient. 16
However, in 1992 conflict over the need to retain the walls
escalated significantly, centering on the need to reexamine defense
spending in light of the failed Soviet coup. It began even before
the 1991 budget process had been concluded. In the fall of 1991,
10
Congressman Barney Frank, Democrat of Massachusetts, announced
"Operation Jericho," a plan by House Democrats to remove the walls
separating the defense budget from other discretionary spending. 17
On September 12, the Senate urged the President and congressional
leaders to review the spending limits for domestic programs in
light of changes in the global situation. 18 Senator Bill Bradley,
Democrat of New Jersey, argued that "If the end of communism in the
Soviet Union isn't a pretext for changing procedural agreement in
Congress, I don't know what is." 19 Opposing the proposal to remove
the walls, Senator Richard Lugar, Republican of Indiana, warned
that such action would cause spending restraint to be abandoned:
"^You're going to have a flying wedge here' that could lead to
everything from more unemployment benefits to * flood relief in
Mississippi.'" 20 In December, Senator Byrd, Chairman of the Senate
Appropriations Committee, wrote President Bush urying him to drop
the walls in order to shift funds from defense to the domestic
discretionary accounts. 21 President Bush hinted that he might do
just that in a television interview on January 3, 1992.
"When he released hrs proposal tot defense spending in January,
however, President Bush took a different approach. Instead of
agreeing to crop the walls, which would allow defense funds to be
diverted to domestic or international purposes, the President
adhered to the premise of the BEA. The difference between the BEA
defense cap and the amount requested—approximately $7.5 billion
—





The size of the defense budget in 1992 was directly linked to
the issue of whether the walls would remain in place. If the walls
were taken down, it seemed clear that the defense budget would be
cut far beyond what the President proposed. If the walls were
retained, the defense budget would be determined by other
considerations, including the threat, the political impact of the
large cuts in defense spending that were already underway, and the
recession. 23
The Congressional Budget Office recommended retaining the
walls. CBO Director Reischauer told the Senate Armed Services
Committee that even the larger cuts in defense proposed by some in
Congress would not prevent major reductions in non-defense
discretionary spending in the outyears, if the overall cap on
discretionary spending was retained. 2U
Nonetheless, the drive to take down the walls and shift
defense funds to domestic discretionary programs continued. In
March, fifteen House committee chairpersons, including 12 of the 13
appropriations subcommittee chairs, announced their support for
legislation which would -remove the BEA walls rn 1992, a year before
they would otherwise expire. 25 The Chairman of the Defense
Appropriations Subcommittee did not support the measure. The walls
bill, sponsored by Congressman John Conyers, Democrat of Michigan,
would allow Congress to spend a portion of defense savings on non-
defense discretionary programs and allocate the remainder to
deficit reduction. The New York Times dubbed the Conyers bill a
"tastes great, less filling bill" that allowed Congress to both
12
reduce the deficit and address social needs. 26 The Times also
commented that the "largest thing standing in the way of financing
a new domestic agenda in America is the annual allocation for
defense" and that "defense is the only pool of money that Congress
can raid to get more resources." 27
In early March, the House passed a double option budget
resolution, with both options cutting defense by more than twice as
much as the Bush budget. The options were designed to address the
possibility that the Conyers bill would be successful in bringing
down the walls. Option A allocated 75 percent of the "savings"
from defense spending to domestic programs, the remaining 25
percent to be used for deficit reduction, on the assumption that
the walls would come down. Option B devoted all of the savings to
deficit reduction. On March 6, House Republicans forced a floor
vote on the two options. Option B won by a vote of 224 to 191,
dthering support from Democrats who were concerned about the
deficit and the impact of further defense-related job losses in
their districts. This vote, suggesting strong support for deficit
^reduction, fear of the economic impact of further defense cuts and
reluctance to abandon the spending restraint implicit in the BEA
walls, signalled the fate of the Conyers bill.
After being p tponed four times, the Conyers bill came to
a vote and failed, 187-238, embarrassing the House leadership.
This meant that any savings from defense would be allocated to
deficit reduction, as prescribed by the BEA and in accordance with
the vote for option B on the House Budget Resolution. Defeat of
13
the Conyers bill meant that domestic discretionary appropriation
bills would be constrained by the tight cap imposed by the BEA
since no new funds could be transferred from defense. For those
accounts with delayed obligations from FY 1992, the cap would be
even tighter. 28
The Senate had defeated its version of the Conyers bill
earlier, 50-48, on a procedural vote. Opposed to bringing down the
walls, the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator
Nunn, said, "If the bill were passed, the defense budget will
become the equivalent of the House Bank." 29
Following the failure of overt efforts to reallocate funds
among the BEA discretionary categories agreed to in 1990, other,
,
more oblique initiatives to the same effect were undertaken during
the remainder of the budget process. Examples of these efforts
include the following:
-an assumption in the House Budget Resolution that $3 billion
would be transferred from defense to domestic accounts to fund
defense conversion activities;
—a "transfer of $400 million from foreign aid to domestic
spending on the House transportation appropriations bill;
-an amendment to the Senate defense authorization bill which
would have allowed DoD to spend up to $300 million for peacekeeping
to be scored against the international cap rather than defense;
-an amendment to the Senate defense appropriations bill
requiring DOD to transfer $185-200 million to a domestic agency for
breast cancer research; 30
14
-the allocation of defense funds to three non-defense
subcommittees by the Senate Appropriations Committee "to ease the
burden on domestic appropriations by using defense money to pay
costs that are viewed as legitimately defense-related but which
have generally been paid for with domestic money." 31
-the inclusion in the defense appropriations conference
agreement of $1.8 billion for "economic conversion," some of which
was to be transferred from DoD to domestic agencies such as Labor
and Commerce.
Thus, at every step in the process, in both chambers and in a
variety of legislative vehicles, attempts were made to evade the
discipline of the BEA represented by walls between discretionary
spending categories, but those efforts failed. Support for these
unsuccessful efforts was fueled by the Appropriations Committees,
which chafed significantly under the domestic discretionary
spending cap for FY 1993.
The BEA caps had increased domestic discretionary spending
more than $40 billion above the CBO baseline for the FY 1991-93
period.32 However, most of <this growth occurred in the first two
years, and for FY 1993 the surplus was gone. The FY 1993 cap,
already tight, was even more restrictive because Congress had
deferred outlays for FY 1992 spending until FY 1993. The acting
Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee warned his
colleagues that "*This" is going to be the most difficult year we've
had since I've been on the committee * [and] I've been on the
committee for 38 years.'" 33 The ranking Republican on the
15
committee, Representative Joe McDade of Pennsylvania, praised the
Democrats for giving committee Republicans more access to spending
data, but then noted, [It's] "shared harakiri. ,,3A For the first
time in its 127 year history, the House Appropriations Committee
held a press briefing to explain the difficulty it faced in meeting
the FY 1993 cap. 35
Congress devoted considerable time and energy attempting to
modify these restraints, directly and indirectly. However,
spending discipline was maintained, and Congress completed all
appropriations bills by Oct 5, the earliest adjournment since 1988.
Two factors explain the failure of the effort to remove the
walls. 36 First, the deficit estimates were grim; the President's
Budget predicted a deficit of $399 billion for 1992. Second, there
was a reluctance to suffer the political consequences if the walls
came down and larger cuts were taken in defense.
The recession, which also affected these developments, cut two
ways. It encouraged the notion of increased domestic spending as
part of a fiscal stimulus approach to ending the recession.
However, it made it difficult to vote for such spending if "the
funds were to come from defense. Defense jobs—defense industry,
active duty military and DoD civilians—were already being cut
dramatically and bases were closing. In this environment,
accelerating the defense drawdown significantly beyond the Bush
plan was not perceived as a viable political strategy.
In the end, Congress passed, and tJie President signed, a set
of authorization and appropriation bills which not only met, but
/ 16
were below the BEA caps for discretionary spending. In fact, Table
1 indicates that cumulative discretionary spending was held below
the cap on both budget authority and outlays, and that none of the
three separate categories of discretionary spending exceeded its
BEA cap, either in budget authority or outlays.
Table 1





































Source: Congressional Budget Office, Final Sequestra*titm Report
For Fiscal Year 1993, October 19, 1992.
Senator Byrd, who began the year insisting that defense
savings be spent on domestic discretionary programs rather than
used for deficit reduction, ended the year praising Congress for
its frugal conduct in making appropriations. Necessity—devoting
defense savings to deficit reduction—had become a virtue. Not
only did Congress appropriate below the BEA caps, the Senator
17
noted, but "to those who continue the old chant about the budget-
busting ways of Congress, let me refer again to the fact that the
appropriators have spent $8.7 billion less than the President
requested. "37
It is clear from Table 1 that restraint in discretionary
spending under the BEA in 1992, which resulted in deficit reduction
in excess of the amount assumed by the caps, took the form of
defense cuts. Of the $8.7 billion total cited by Senator Byrd as
being below the Bush request, 74 percent was taken from
appropriations for defense and military construction. 38
In summary, Congress found a way to abide by the BEA walls and
caps, despite the restraints they imposed. These restraints were
the price Congress agreed to pay for deficit reduction when they
were accepted in 1990.
Entitlements
In response to a Bush budget which made minimal demands in the
area of entitlement spending for FY 1993, Congress stood pat.
Conflicts over cuts in programs or increases in taxes necessary to
comply with the BEA's PAYGO requirement were muted, as compared
with 1991, while debate over amending the BEA to cap entitlements
generated moderate interest.
The Bush administration proposed several changes in
entitlement programs which would have lowered the entitlement
baseline by reducing benefits, chiefly in Medicare and crop support
payments to wealthy recipients. Combining FY 1992 and FY 1993
impacts, as dictated by the BEA, the president's budget would have
18
reduced entitlement spending by $6.5 billion. 39 The administration
also approved two entitlement bills extending unemployment
benefits, both of which, as new entitlements, came under the BEA
PAYGO rules. In 1991, similar legislation was the focus of
protracted and bitter debate over the question of whether benefits
should be paid for or declared an emergency, the options available
under the BEA. 40
The 1992 extensions were much less controversial. The first
bill, providing $2.7 billion in new benefits, was paid for with a
portion of the 1991 PAYGO surplus and a small tax change affecting
corporations. 41 The second bill, costing $5.5 billion over six
years, was offset by increases in revenues. 42
On the procedural front, the administration proposed, but did
not strongly support, a radical change to the BEA approach to
entitlement spending. Under the BEA, existing entitlements are
allowed to grow without limit; only new programs are subject to the
PAYGO deficit neutral rule. 43 In its budget submission to
Cc-ngress, the administration proposed amending the BEA to subject
entitlement spending to caps enforced by sequestration. 44
Congress ignored President Bush's major programmatic changes
to entitlement spending. Although the congressional budget
resolution provided for $2 billion in entitlement savings, implying
that programmatic cuts would follow in the budget process, this
initiative was not pursued. Congress did extend unemployment
benefits, funded as noted above. In fac£, these two bills were the
only entitlement measures of any consequence to pass Congress in
s
19
1992. A number of other entitlement bills passed—more than 50 by
October—but the funding implications of the non-unemployment bills
were either negligible or non-existent/ 5
On the other hand, several bills passed the House which would
have increased entitlement spending. The House approved the Older
Americans Reauthorization Act, raising the earnings cap affecting
Social Security recipients and increasing entitlement spending $7.3
billion. 46 This bill, as well as another Social Security measure
affecting the so-called "notch babies" which would have increased
entitlement spending, was dropped in the Senate.
Congressional action on caps for entitlement spending took two
forms. The House initiative was found in a report issued by the
Chairman of the House Budget Committee. 47 The Committee endorsed
a cap "enforced through the budget process, on the growth of
entitlement programs, in order to reduce their underlying growth
rate to a sustainable figure." 48 However, the legislation
necessary to implement this conclusion was not reported out of
committee.
In the Senate, the notion of capping entitlements to cut the
deficit made it to the floor. An entitlement cap amendment co-
sponsored by Senators Sam Nunn, Democrat of Georgia, and Pete
Domenici, Republican of New Mexico, was offered to the Senate
budget resolution for FY 1993. The amendment was withdrawn when it




DISCRETIONARY AND ENTI . L.EMENT SPENDING
UNDER THE BUDGET ENFORCEMENT ACT, 1990-1992
(dollars are outlays in billions)
1990 1991 1992 Absolute Change
(FY1991) TFY1992) (FY1993)* 1990-1992
Entitlements 634.2 711.2 770 +135.8
Percentage of
Total Spending 47.9 51 52 +4.1
Percentage of
GDP 11.3 12.1 12.5 + 1.2
Discretionary 534.8 537.4 547 + 12
Percentage of
Total Spending 40.4 38.9 37 -3.4
Percentage of
GDP 9.5 9.2 8.9 -0.6
Deficit 269.5 290.2 310 +40.5
Percentage of
GDP 4.8 4.9 5.0 + 0.2
Assumes compliance with discretionary spending caps.
curce: U.S. Congress, Congressional Budget Office, The Economic
and Budget Outlook: Fiscal Years 1994-1998 . January, 1993.
The notion of entitlement caps was inspired by the growing
disparity between spending for entitlements and discretionary
programs, coupled with estimates of increasing deficits. Table 2
indicates the size of the gap during the first three years of the
BEA. The gap is projected to widen significantly over the decade
that follows, as shown by Table 3. By 2002, CBO estimates that
entitlement spending will make up 59.3 percent of total spending,
while the discretionary portion drops to 27.2 percent, or less than
21
half the share of entitlements. Entitlement spending will grow
$642 billion over this decade, nearly five times the $129 billion
increase projected for discretionary spending. The gap between
these two categories of spending widens dramatically despite the
assumption in the estimates that discretionary spending increases
Table 3
SPENDING FOR DISCRETIONARY AND ENTITLEMENT PROGRAMS,
1993-2002
(dollars are outlays in billions)
1993 2002* Absolute Percent
(FY94) (FY03) Chanqe Chancre
Total
Spendinq 1501 2457 +956 +63.7
Percentage
of GDP 23.1 25.4 +2.3 + 10.0
Entitlements 815 1457 + 642 +78.8
Percentage of
Total Spend ing 54.3 59.3 + 5.0 +9.2
Percentage
of GDP 12.5 15.1 +2.6 +20.8
Discretionary 539 668 + 129 +23.9
'*•; Percentage of
Total Spending 35.9 27.2 -8.7 -24.2
Percentage
of GDP 8.3 6.9 -1.4 -16.9
Deficit 287 655 + 368 +128.2
Percentage •.
of GDP 4.4 6.8 +2.4 + 54.5
Assumes discretionary spending keeps pace with inflation after the
BEA caps expire in 1995.
Source: Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the
President's February Budgetary Proposals, March, 1993, Table A-6,
The Ten-Year Budget Outlook.
22
to keep pace with inflation once the BEA caps expire in 1995. By
2002, entitlements as a percentage of GDP grow by 2 0.8 percent,
while discretionary spending declines by 16.9 percent.
In sum, congressional actions on entitlements in 1992 were
quite conservative and entirely compliant with the BEA. As in
1991, Congress ignored administration proposals for cuts in
selected entitlement programs. On a micro-level, the PAYGO
provisions of the BEA appear to be working, that is, no new
entitlement programs were added which would increase the deficit.
On a macro-level, projections of rapidly growing spending for
existing entitlement programs, coupled with rising deficits and the
BEA constraints on discretionary spending, triggered concern that
entitlement spending control under the BEA was inadequate. This
accounts for the debate on entitlement caps and sequesters.
The Deficit
OMB projected a deficit for FY 1992 of $399.4 billion, another
new record. 50 The debt would top $4.1 trillion, more than four
times the level when President Reagan took office. 51 The size of
the deficit made it-difficult for legislators to justify relaxation
of the BEA rule against spending savings below the caps. It
encouraged supporters of the balanced budget amendment, which came
within nine votes of passing in the House, and enhanced rescission
powers for the President, which the House approved. It also
bolstered the arguments of those who proposed capping entitlements
(Panetta in the House, Nunn-Domenici in the Senate) as part of a
long term deficit reduction plan, even though neither approach was
23
successful in 1992. 52
Such deficit reduction as occurred in FY 1993 was as required
by the BEA, i.e., the result of funding discretionary programs,
primarily defense, at or below the cap levels and maintaining
deficit neutrality for new entitlement and tax legislation. In the
face of a mild but persistent recession, these relatively anemic
measures were not sufficient to prevent another record deficit.
Moreover, they left in place a structure of spending which allowed
existing entitlement programs to grow without limit. As Table 2
indicates, spending for entitlements increased more than ten times
as much as discretionary spending during the first three years
under the BEA.
The approach to deficit reduction taken in 1992 was based on
a unique set of circumstances. Defense savings were made possible
by a 25 percent reduction in forces written into the BEA in 1990
when it became apparent that the Cold War was over. A plan to cut
defense spending over five years, initiated in 1991, reduced
defense outlays more than $350 billion below real spending set in
1990, when the Cold "War ended. As CBO reported to the Sena-te Armed
Services Committee, "a large peace dividend was clearly built into
the budget projections as of last year." 53 Future efforts to cut
the deficit would have to transcend the spending control tactic
established in the BEA which relied so heavily upon the Peace
Dividend.
Taxes
On the tax front, 1992 witnessed sound and fury, but nothing
24
significant in the way of results. Tax policy wa driven by
economic and social concerns, rather than the deficit, and
consequently took place outside the budget resolution. President
Bush called for a tax cut to stimulate the economy as the budget
year began and a congressional bidding war to cut taxes ensued. The
House and Senate passed the Tax Fairness and Economic Growth Act of
1992, a $77.5 billion tax bill, which Bush immediately and
successfully vetoed. This tax bill, which would have violated the
BEA's deficit neutral rule by increasing the deficit slightly over
four years, was passed before the budget resolution passed. 54
Congress passed a second tax bill, HR 11, the Urban Aid/Tax
bill, after the budget resolution was complete. HR 11, stimulated
by the Los Angeles riots, would provide tax breaks within urban
enterprise zones. It would have added $5.7 billion to the deficit,
in violation of the BEA. It also contained numerous provisions
that would add to the deficit outside the 5 year window of the
BEA. 55 President Bush vetoed it the day after the election, and
because Congress was not in session, it died.
.In summary, Congress did not raise taxes to reduce the
deficit, either within the budget process (pursuant to the budget
resolution) or outside it. Both tax bills passed by Congress would
have used new revenues for new spending and increased the deficit
slightly. Because they failed, the BEA floor on revenues was
retained. However, the recession diminished the impact of these
revenues on the flow of funds to the Treasury.
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Observations
The walls between discretionary spending categories held,
while defense was cut below its cap. The deficit increased,
providing confirmation that spending control in the BEA, although
effective, was not deficit control. Table 4 illustrates changes in
the BEA maximum deficit target, taken from the President's 1992




(dollar outlays in billions)
Year 1990 1/1992 7/1992 1/1993
1991 327 268.7 277.6 —
1992 317 399.4 323.7 290.2
1993 236 351.9 342.3 327.3
1994 102 211.4 274.8 292.4
1995 83 192.1 220.7 272.4
Sources: Budget of the United States Government Fiscal Year 1993
Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1992), Table 2-3, Outlays, Revenues and
Deficit, 25; Mid-Session Review: The President's Budget and
Econcomic Growth Agenda, July 24, 1992, (Washington, D.C.: GPO),
Table 2-18, Federal Government Financing and Debt, 25; Budget
Baselines, Historical Data, and Alternatives For the Future 1993
(Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1993), Table 4.1, Baseline Estimates Under
Alternative Assumptions.
The major reason why the deficit estimate dropped during 1992
was that Congress delayed in appropriating additional funds for the
bailout of the savings and loan industry, shifting this payment to
future years. In 1991, deficit estimates shrunk as a consequence
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of the accumulation of and payment for Desert Shield/D sert Storm
costs between fiscal years. Hidden in the maze of nur- s for 1993
and beyond is a series of economic and technical adjustments, not
new policy expenses.
Just as the macro deficit targets were adjusted for economic
and technical factors, and for emergency bills, so too were the
discretionary spending caps. The analyst who searches for the
political system's performance against the original BEA caps as a
measurement tool will be somewhat misled by these adjustments.
Nonetheless, there was a discipline of a sort involved here and in
the main the political system reacted responsibly to it, even if
its actions were complex and hard to track by simple numerical
indicators.
Table 1 indicates that final appropriations during 1992 were
under the discretionary caps for all three discretionary categories
by a total of $16.2 billion in BA and $10.1 billion in outlays.
Although defense was the largest contributor to the amount under
the cap, even domestic discretionary outlays met the cap limit for
FY 1993. By this test , the BEA was a .success in 1992.
Although defense was cut below its cap, it was not put in free
fall. Testimony on the defense budget before the Senate Armed
Services Committee was dominated by talk about defense as jobs.
Senator John Glenn, Democrat of Ohio, warned the Committee that "we
need. . . to ensure that as we downsize the military, we don't
downsize our economy along with it." 56 Arguments about maintaining
the defense industrial base became intermixed with not increasing
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unemployment by canceling weapons systems; this was particularly
true for the complex and expensive Seawolf submarine. It also
became clear that downsizing a volunteer professional military was
different from disbanding draftees once an emergency had passed.
Although the defense budget would continue to drop sharply, hopes
for even steeper cuts to bankroll an extended non-defense wish list
were doomed to disappointment.
While the BEA's PAYGO provisions were effective in preventing
new entitlements or tax breaks from increasing the deficit, they
did not stop the escalating growth of entitlement expenditures
already in the baseline, especially health care programs. The BEA
thus secured an asymmetrical spending configuration. For example,
Medicaid spending grew about 13 percent annually from 1985 through
1990, but that growth raiie more than doubled to 28 percent in 1991
and grew another 30 percent in 1992. 57 Baseline estimates for the
period from 1994 through 1998 indicate an increase of 82 percent. 58
Although Social Security cost growth projections are relatively
modest (27 percent from 1994 through 1998) , increases in Medicare
trosts xival Medicaid growth—=a projected 77 percent increase over
the five year period. 59 "Most budget experts now agree," according
to Congressional Quarterly , "that the biggest potentially
controllable cause of deficits is runaway spending for entitlement
programs and that the biggest entitlement programs are Medicare and
Medicaid." 60
Table 2 compares spending for discretionary and entitlement
programs under the BEA for FY 1991-93. Discretionary accounts
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shrunk as a percentage of total spending and as a percentage of
GDP, while the entitlement accounts grew significantly, despite the
absence of significant new programs and a general adherence to the
PAYGO offset provisions. Programs in the entitlement baseline
grew, some of them explosively. Had the designers of the BEA
anticipated the dramatic expansion of these mandatory accounts,
they might have put a look back provision in the BEA to review
programs in the mandatory base which were experiencing cost
acceleration.
Clarity Versus Control
Budgeting under the BEA in 1992, the final year of separate
categories for discretionary spending, demonstrates an important
trade-off. Spending control was achieved at the expense of
clarity. Clarity had been served by the Congressional Budget Act
of 1974, which provided regularity and information, and by Gramm-
Rudman-Hol lings, as a consequence of its focus upon a single
deficit target each fiscal year. Clarity is diminished under the
BEA, which involves ambiguities in targets, timing and policy.
Instead of a single deficit target, there are several, and
they are adjusted twice annually. the caps on discretionary
spending must be adjusted for emergency spending and technical
factors—separately through FY 1993 and in the aggregate through FY
1995. Thus no single number is available to gauge the success of
the process. Success must be measured in terms of a maximum
deficit allowance, three discretionary spending caps and scoring of
legislation subject to PAYGO (entitlements and taxes)
.
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Supplemental appropriation bills are scored as either dire
emergencies exempt from the caps and deficit targets, or against
one of the discretionary categories. In all cases, both budget
authority and outlay calculations are necessary. Finally, the
maximum deficit amount is adjusted for economic, technical and
policy changes, but most of the adjustments are so complex that the
enlightened consumer has no recourse but to take OMB or CBO numbers
as correct.
There are also ambiguities of time. The PAYGO provision has
carry-overs from one year to the next, so that laws which decrease
spending in one year are set against increases in the amount spent
the next year. To further complicate scoring and accountability,
President Bush signed certain PAYGO provisions after the OMB final
sequester report had been issued, thus forcing the next President
to determine whether to change the maximum deficit targets to avoid
a sequester in early 1993. Hence in 1992, PAYGO spending was
effected by what was done in 1991 while simultaneously binding what
would be done in 1993. This accommodation to the fact that
-entitlements, axe not single year appropriation blurs the time
clarity of the annual budget cycle. 61
Examples of policy ambiguity may be found in defining
emergencies such as unemployment insurance benefits and in scoring
items as deficit neutral or as paid for by previous year balances
or by administrative savings. In the case of veteran's education
benefits in 1991, what would seem to be an entitlement was treated
as an appropriation.
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If clarity has been diminished, what control has been gained?
The answer, according to CBO, is something very much like what the
supporters of the BEA promised in 1990, i.e., an appreciable
measure of deficit reduction: "If the changes in spending and
taxes agreed to in 1990 had never happened, the deficits in 1991
through 1995 would be close to $500 billion higher than current
estimates." 62 Where the BEA provided for control, control has been
effective. Where control was not provided for, spending and
revenue problems have continued to increase the deficit.
The continued rise in the deficit does not, in and of itself,
implicate the BEA. The problem for the BEA is that the bar
representing deficit reduction has been raised since 1990. A weak
economy and rapid increases in spending for health care are the
primary sources of higher deficit estimates. Neither of these
factors fall within the controls established by the BEA. The BEA,
Allen Schick has pointed out, "is a recipe for political
accommodation, not for ending the deficit crisis." 63
Summary
The description of budgeting under the first year under the
BEA works as well for the second: "Technical corrections were made
which increased deficit estimates. However, a growing deficit
neither dominated nor disrupted the budget process. . . abuses were
resisted, and complex scoring and political scrimmages resulted." 64
The process was generally timely—the final appropriation bill was
signed on October 5, 1992. No sequesters were necessary, although
in at least one instance CBO advisory estimates indicated that a
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small PAYGO sequester was in order.
More than 50 PAYGO provisions took effect, but only the two
unemployment bills had significant budget or policy impacts. A
notable attempt to evade the PAYGO deficit neutral discipline was
found in legislation that would trigger increases in the deficit
beyond the five year window of the BEA. Criticizing this evasive
tactic, Allen Schick has noted that for elected officials,
"anything short of forever isn't long enough." 65
Spending was controlled as required by the BEA; on the
discretionary side of the ledger, where controls actually meant
cuts, Congress actually exceeded the requirement of the BEA by
funding defense below its FY 1993 cap. 66 For entitlements, OMB
estimated that PAYGO legislation provided a nominal additional
increment of deficit reduction for FY 1993.
Congress complied with the caps and walls on discretionary
spending, and adhered to the prophylactic requirements affecting
entitlement and revenue bills as well. However, deficit reduction,
the result of defense cuts, was accompanied by increased estimates
x>f future deficits. Table 3 indicates that the deficit would -grow
by 12 8.2 percent over the next decade. This was the consequence of
slow economic growth and unanticipated spending for health care
entitlements, which emerged as the primary expenditure problem.
Congress expended significant amounts of time and energy
considering tax laws and the propriety of the walls separating
defense from the other discretionary spending categories. The tax
bills would have had little impact on the deficit, and in any case,
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failed. The walls, symbolizing spending restraint and deficit
reduction, were retained. Both the tax ^ills and the walls bill
would have increased the deficit. While the budget controls
prescribed by the BEA were rather faithfully implemented in 1992,
the deficit continued to grow and the clarity of the budget process
was diminished. Frc .lin's characterization of the BEA as "more
than a failure and less than a success" seems appropriate. 67
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